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Memory was busy with the events of many years. i retraced step by 
step the pilgrimage of my past life, until arriving at that passage in 
its sombre history, i . . . secretly marvelled, 
“What brought me here?” 
“Providence,” was the answer which the soul gave. “. . . You 
form a connecting link in the destinies of many.” 
        — Susanna Moodie, Roughing It in the Bush (199) 
n his january 2004 talk as part of the Munro Beattie lecture ser-
ies at Carleton University, Alistair MacLeod gave a brief account 
of his family history. Relating a story about his grandmother, 
MacLeod spoke of his ancestor using an intriguing verb tense, referring 
to her as the woman who “was to become my grandmother” (“Writer’s 
Life”). While was to become confers on the grandmother an identity and 
destiny after the fact, one’s inflection on the verb was is also important, 
for if you separate the two verbs, was and become, it suggests something 
rather different. She “was to become my grandmother,” as if to say she 
existed in order to become my ancestor. The simultaneous necessity and 
contingency contained in the phrase are striking and provide an evoca-
tive entry point into MacLeod’s acclaimed novel, No Great Mischief, a 
work that circles around the contradictions of chance, destiny, origins, 
and genealogy by evincing a kind of ambivalent compulsion for repeti-
tion linking past with present. 
No Great Mischief is propelled by a drive for genealogy. The geneal-
ogy of the clann Chalum Ruaidh looks back to where their “Canadian” 
family line can be said to begin, mimicking a kind of Mayflower land-
ing on the coast of Cape Breton and marking a moment from which 
the Canadian branch of clann Chalum Ruaidh, and the Canadian 
nation itself, were to begin. As the narrator tells his sister, were it not 
for a Macdonald’s presence on the Plains of Abraham, “the history 
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of Canada might be different” (236). indeed, as the novel traces the 
progeny of the originary Calum Ruadh over subsequent generations, 
the clann are made emblematic founders of Canadian settlement. “i 
think of them as winning Canada for us,” retorts Grandpa to the other 
grandfather’s sceptical account of General Wolfe’s abuse of the Scottish 
Highlanders in Quebec (108). 
Long after death, the originary Calum Ruadh shadows the family’s 
lives. As both a memento mori and a reminder of origins, he is com-
memorated on the boulder marking his grave, which looks out, stead-
fastly, from the rocky point. The hold of Calum Ruadh is strong, as is 
his superego-like gaze. Nearly all of the descendants, we’re told, have 
“large families . . . which led in turn to . . . complicated genealogies, 
over all of which [Calum Ruadh’s] name continued to preside” (28). 
More significantly, his red hair keeps popping up in subsequent des-
cendants as a reminder of his priority. in this way, the novel invites 
various speculations about the conflicted role of genealogy in the con-
stitution of identity and teleology. “each of us repeat[s] his own small 
history,” the narrator says of himself and his brother Calum (13). Yet the 
gap between past and present remains unfathomable. Were we meant 
to become what we are in the future? Or is the intent applied only after 
the fact? To what extent is the past part of a teleological chain leading 
up to the present? As Margaret Atwood expresses the “conundrum” of 
historical and individual memory, “how do we know we are who we 
think we are . . . ?” (8). Or, more specifically, how do we know we are 
who we were meant to become? 
A prime source of the novel’s power is the way that it plays on this 
paradox of contingency and origin. The word contingency, as it is used 
in contemporary literary theory, commonly means either “accident” (the 
contingency of fate) or “inevitability” (something being contingent on or 
determined by something else). This might be likened to our everyday 
notion of the word chance: “by chance” signalling something occurring 
by accident, “a chance” signalling an opportunity, a way of directing 
one’s fate or making things happen. We see this distinction in two 
overt references to “chance” in the novel: the “come by chance” child 
(the grandfather) who is an accident, an embarrassment, a what should 
not have been; and Grandma and Grandpa’s reference to “The Chance,” 
the opportunity that determines their future prosperity, the what was 
meant to be.1
 
Likewise, the notion of “origins” contains two divergent 
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meanings: referring to a line of descent that is multiple, sequential; and, 
in the words originary/original, meaning the first, the only, the singular. 
The “passivity” of origins in the former sense is transformed to the latter 
via an imposition of intentionality. Yet, as edward Said observes in his 
meditation on “beginnings,” the authority of a beginning as a singular 
event or “original achievement” paradoxically gains its worth “precisely 
because it is so often repeated thereafter” (32). Genealogies evoke both 
terms, “contingency” and “origin,” and both meanings of each term. 
They emphasize origins, both in the sense of the duplication of origins 
(inheritance) and in the sense of beginnings and therefore singularity 
(what sets one apart, what distinguishes one). Likewise, since they are 
at once future and past oriented, genealogies emphasize the contingent 
in the midst of apparent destiny; they effect what Benedict Anderson 
identifies as a conversion of “chance into destiny” (12). On the other 
hand, they also highlight the pure “chancishness” of fate. This combina-
tion of destiny and chance elicits what we might term the “back to the 
future” effect: a gazing upon the past (specifically one’s ancestors) to 
ensure that destiny (oneself ) does not get sidetracked. The compulsion 
for genealogy is marked by an insistence on the predestined for fear that 
it might be gripped by the precarious. “We will live a long, long time,” 
predicts one of the Macdonald grandfathers in No Great Mischief, “if 
we are given the chance” (17). 
in “The ‘Uncanny,’” Sigmund Freud speaks of the unsettling effect 
of contingency and origins. We are all committed to the uniqueness of 
our identities (and hence fear the appearance of a double), yet we are 
equally compelled by a drive toward heredity and genealogy (which 
means that we welcome the appearance of genetic links and doubles). 
When the double takes the form of a genetic relation, it brings both of 
these processes into conflict in the sense that the desire for uniqueness 
and originality is brought face to face with the desire for lineage or 
inheritance. The unhomely double thus embodies psychic anxiety and 
is connected both to birth and origins (where does one come from?) and 
figurative death (what happens if one is not unique?). Paradoxically, the 
proliferation of unhomely doubling can have a reassuring effect since 
it reiterates one’s origins. in other words, the uncanny double can be 
marshalled in substantiation of genealogical inheritance and continuity. 
in this sense, a form of genealogical repetition embodies a seeking of 
uniqueness even as it undermines the quest for uniqueness. The simulac-
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ral effect of the repetition encompasses two contradictory possibilities. 
if a simulacrum is that for which there is no original, it can neverthe-
less trace the quest for origins as a kind of slippage, a repetition with a 
difference. Repetition functions as a way of avoiding an awareness of 
both radical contingency and divine ordination. Said explains this in 
his account of Vico’s formulation of the dialectic of history: repetition 
“will equally avoid the despair of seeing history as gratuitous occurrence 
as well as the boredom of seeing history as realizing a foreordained blue-
print” (World 113). if duplication at once gives you a sense of origins 
and historical legitimacy, while undercutting any sense of originality, 
it assuages the anxiety of the latter through the containing effects of 
the former. The repeating double functions as a way of disavowing the 
contingency of beginnings and endings, in part because the process of 
duplication circumvents the progressivist problem of teleology. 
Jane Urquhart’s poetic meditation on MacLeod’s vision argues that 
for MacLeod the “biological and genetic” can never “be connected to 
that which is ephemeral or casual” (41). it is the “utter absence of the 
casual,” she argues, “that gives MacLeod’s stories their enormous power” 
(41). i would argue the precise opposite: it is the relentless weight of the 
casual or contingent that renders the lives of MacLeod’s characters (and 
human existence generally) so compelling. The attempt to evade the 
inevitability of fate/contingency lends to human existence a simultan-
eously terrifying and reassuring aspect. 
david Creelman’s analysis of MacLeod’s two short-story collec-
tions charts a movement “from the realist genre’s emphasis on cause 
and effect,” evident in The Lost Salt Gift of Blood (1976), “in favour of 
the romance tradition with its emphasis on predetermined patterns” 
(“Hoping” 92), as in As Birds Bring Forth the Sun (1986). No Great 
Mischief, i would argue, notwithstanding the fact that it was published 
after these collections, stands somewhere in between; in fact, it takes 
this conundrum as its very subject: that is, the problem of whether 
human existence is determined by contingency or fate. What is it, pre-
cisely, that is inherited, and how powerful are individuals in altering or 
responding to this inheritance? Since we all inherit our ancestors, do we 
also inherit their hauntings (i.e., what they were haunted by), or is this 
simply a reading of a cause into an effect? is there such a thing as a gen-
etic unconscious, and if so to what extent is there potential for choice? 
Can we ever choose to be who we become, or is this always something 
thrust on us by the legacy of the dead? 
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These concerns were present in a number of MacLeod’s short stor-
ies before the publication of No Great Mischief, particularly “As Birds 
Bring Forth the Sun” and “Vision.” in the former story, the cù mòr 
glas (“the big grey dog”) exists as a marker of the ambiguity of fate, 
something that “it is hard to not know [that] you do know” (Island 
319), even if it is only known at the level of what Christopher Bollas 
terms the “unthought known.” if the cù mòr glas exists as a kind of 
curse or inheritance (and a repeating double) passed down through the 
family line, “something close to a genetic possibility” (Island 318), it is 
unclear whether its origins were accidental or predestined. The killing of 
the great-great-great-grandfather by his beloved cù mòr glas transforms 
the familiar family friend into the unheimlich “big grey dog of death” 
(317). As a result, an originary accident is transformed into destiny, 
and genealogical inheritance (origins) becomes inextricably linked with 
mortality.2
 
A similar pattern occurs in the short story “Vision,” which contains 
a series of repetitions and doublings (including a number of twins) that 
create a distinctly uncanny effect. The narrator’s ancestor is described as 
a “Son of Uncertainty” (Island 355), pointing to his illegitimacy, yet this 
becomes an inherited trait to the extent that subsequent descendants 
are described as “children of uncertainty” (367). The literal displace-
ment, and contingency, of the ancestral line have been converted into 
an inherited psychic condition. However, the family genealogy is also 
characterized by its capacity for Da Shealladh, or “second sight,” which 
suggests a double capacity: the ability to view the pure contingency of 
events/fate, and, in some instances, the ability to escape the traumatic 
eruption of contingency (e.g., the father’s escape at Normandy). in the 
story, to have vision is to see the “accident” of the future without being 
able to change it, thereby highlighting destiny as inherently contin-
gent. One would think that the point of having second sight would be 
to enable one to alter events, to arrange events a second time. But Da 
Shealladh is also translated as “two sights” (326), or seeing double. in 
this sense, reiteration merely reinforces the fixity of the accident as a 
formative event, irreversibly transforming accident into destiny (as in 
the story of Oedipus, an obvious intertext in the narrative). MacLeod 
takes these questions of accident and destiny as they relate to individual 
human existence and transposes them onto a historical-genealogical 
level, contemplating physical or genetic traits that are inherited (e.g., 
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red hair, black hair, twins) alongside the experiences or stories that get 
passed down as seeming genetic traces so that both appear to be “in the 
blood.” in MacLeod’s fictions, what is “inherited” is the trauma of a pri-
mary ancestor whose experience is passed down the family line, though 
whether as an inherited predisposition or as a duplicating coincidence 
is unclear.3
By 1999, MacLeod had expanded his interest in these questions 
to the point that they became one of the central threads of No Great 
Mischief. in striving to make sense of his proliferating genealogy, the 
narrator seeks to order and taxonomize the past after the fact. As Said 
puts it in his discourse on beginnings, we seek to “apprehend an other-
wise dispersed number of circumstances and to put them in some sort 
of telling order” (41). We seek in our genealogy “foreshadowings of 
[our]selves,” says Catherine to her brother in No Great Mischief (235). 
We scrutinize our ancestors for what they were to become. This is true 
of the grandfather’s imagined figuration of his absent father as resem-
bling himself. in a willed reversal of chronology, the grandfather enacts 
a retrospective imposition of destiny. “Rather than saying the children 
look like their parents, he’s trying to make the parent look like him,” 
MacLeod states in his interview with Shelagh Rogers. “And i think this 
idea of understanding where you came from is a central one within the 
novel” (22). The more our culture becomes infused with technologies 
of duplication and counterfeiting (as the narrator keeps coming back to 
in his thoughts about orthodontics and plastic surgery), “the more con-
fused we are about the unique, the original,” and “authenticity can no 
longer be rooted in singularity” (Schwartz 11, 17). Perhaps in response 
to this dilemma of duplication, our culture is becoming increasingly 
propelled by what i would call a reinvestment in “filiation.”4 This might 
explain the narrator’s confusion in the novel, not to mention MacLeod’s 
own obsession with the paradox of origins. 
in the novel, the origins themselves proliferate through the simul-
taneously haunting and reassuring reappearance of “the little red-haired 
boy” descendant, the gille beag ruadh (18). The narrator, one of many 
Alexander Macdonalds, is himself a kind of clone — one of the many 
gille beag ruadhs that the family line has produced. On the other hand, 
for this particular branch of the clann Chalum Ruaidh, he is the gille 
beag ruadh, the one to which they all keep coming back. As a stand-in 
for the original progenitor, the gille beag ruadh ’s appearance signals 
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what Bruce Fink identifies as “the return, not of the same, but of the 
different” (223), one in an endless line of substitutions in which it is not 
the familiar that returns but something that only appears familiar. it 
is a representation of “the object that never was . . . but which is retro-
actively constituted as having had to have been lost” (228). in the gille 
beag ruadh, subject and lost object become fused. 
if our hero, Alexander Macdonald, is in a sense the original gille 
beag ruadh within the immediate family (his brothers, parents, and 
grandparents insist on attaching this epithet to him and to no other 
— not, for example, to his similarly red-haired cousin Alexander, nor to 
the American Alexander who is taken in by the brothers as a Vietnam 
draft dodger), he also represents the presenced past, the stand-in for that 
history which can never be delivered in palpable form. He is spoken 
of as the gille beag ruadh, but when his sister Catherine is travelling in 
Scotland years later some long-lost relations identify him as a gille beag 
ruadh (165). Replicas of him keep popping up (both in hair colour and 
name), effecting a kind of derridean proliferation, a persistent distan-
cing from a point of origin that undermines the drive for singularity 
and authenticity. The more you try to pinpoint an originary ancestor, 
the more he or she exceeds your grasp, the more you succeed only in 
conjuring up an “originary substitute” (Of Grammatology 243).5
 
The 
fear of being purely originary is matched only by the uncanny fear of 
being duplicated. The only purely originary descendant would be a 
true “come by chance,” a foundling or accident, one who is not part of 
the bloodline, what Said would call an “intransitive, ‘pure’ beginning” 
(Beginnings 50). inevitably, the desire for origins meets the anxiety of 
originality. 
At points in No Great Mischief, the reappearance of the gille beag 
ruadh has an uncanny effect, as when Catherine’s son is stopped on the 
street in Calgary and identified as being of the clann Chalum Ruaidh 
(30). One is condemned never to be anonymous. As the narrator notes, 
“Such [red-haired] individuals would manifest themselves as strikingly 
unfamiliar to some, and as eerily familiar to others” (30). At other times, 
the replications become a source of bonding, as when the boys play 
their genealogical word games on out-of-town hockey trips — “What is 
your father’s father’s father’s father’s name?” (29) — invoking a limitless 
retreat into a seemingly immemorial past that fixes them in place and 
time. This effect is reproduced after the death of another red-haired 
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Alexander, the narrator’s cousin, when the clan gathers for the funeral 
at the homestead in Cape Breton. When a police officer shows up to 
charge Calum with speeding and assault, he asks for someone named 
Macdonald, only to be greeted by an echo as the various members 
of the clan shout “Right here” or “Over here” (125). Later the casket 
is adorned with “a small stone chip from the original Calum Ruadh 
boulder” (126). 
The constant encounters with familial descendants should offer the 
narrator some source of consolation for the vague sensation of inauthen-
ticity and melancholy that dogs him. if one mourns “the irretrievable 
loss of the familiar” (Peter Marris qtd. in Riegel, Writing 6), one can 
counter this with a kind of compulsion for repetition to revive the fam-
iliar in acceptable, but haunting, guises. indeed, in a straightforward 
psychic dynamic, the representation of loss is necessarily linked to the 
use of repetition, and one might even say that MacLeod enacts a kind of 
recurrence of recurrence in returning to this motif so often throughout 
his oeuvre. But what is it, after all, that the narrator seeks to reproduce? 
He can never say, since in effect he is haunted by a past that he never 
had, a nostalgia for what he has never known. in a sense, the gille beag 
ruadh feels himself erased, and the proliferation merely underscores his 
position in a sequence of duplicating origins. Calum’s first words to his 
brother in the rooming house in Toronto are significant: “Ah, ’ ille bhig 
ruaidh, you’ve come at last” (8). if his reappearance seems predestined, 
Alexander is nevertheless unsure of his role in the family genealogical 
line, in part because an unbridgeable rift was introduced between him-
self and his older brothers when he was a child.6
 
His destiny, what he 
was to become, was thwarted. Thus, though he continues to be the little 
red-haired boy, which inserts him definitively into the clann Chalum 
Ruaidh, the identification is always unfulfilling, always a figment of 
what MacLeod has enigmatically called “this inherited life” (qtd. in 
Nicholson 94). 
The novel, then, does not so much chart a nostalgic return to a 
recollected past associated with some kind of romantic legitimacy and 
origination. instead, the loss of community and cultural unity that 
so many critics highlight as the central theme of MacLeod’s writings7
 
is already a reality in this narrative in the sense that the narrator was 
never as fully a part of this past as he was meant to be. Alexander does 
not have the luxury of seeing in the past “the organic unity of home” 
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(Hiscock 53), since “home” for him has its origins in disruption. He 
has been deprived of the ability to be nostalgic. in effect, Alexander is 
possessed by the event of an enduring childhood trauma, for he is at the 
mercy of what Cathy Caruth calls “a history that [he] cannot entirely 
possess” (5). Caruth identifies the “haunting power” of trauma in its 
being based on an inherent absence or “forgetting” (4, 8), since the ori-
ginating experience is essentially irretrievable. in such cases, “the event 
is not assimilated or experienced fully at the time, but only belatedly, 
in its repeated possession of the one who experiences it” (4). in a wholly 
unreconcilable way, Alexander’s identity is (and always has been) prem-
ised on his disjunction from a world that nevertheless steadfastly seems 
to claim him.8
 
Yet, even after Alexander states that he can say nothing for certain of 
his originary red-haired ancestor, Calum states that he, Alex, is “still the 
gille beag ruadh” (18). While his red hair may render him generic within 
the clan, it also confers on him an identity and security. derrida has 
written about the ways that family names are “always related to death” 
in that “the one who gives . . . or bears the name will be absent from it” 
(Work 13). The same might be argued for the gille beag ruadh, which, as 
derrida notes of names, declares the unique and the “disappearance of 
the unique” at the same time (34). in school, when asked by the teacher 
to state his name, the boy can only recite what he has been told: “i 
remember thinking of it [gille beag ruadh] as my name and responding 
to it rather than to ‘Alexander,’ which is what is on my birth certificate. 
And even on the first day of primary school . . . i failed to respond when 
my true name was called from the roll” (18). The sense of alienation 
conferred by the name and the reality (the red hair) is repeated further 
in the indeterminacy of red hair as a signifier of identifiable genealogical 
origins. The old man whom Catherine speaks to in the house on the 
beach in Scotland tells her that Bonnie Prince Charlie “‘had red hair. . . . 
And was said to be very fond of girls. Some of us,’ he whispered, ‘may be 
descendants of the prince’” (162-63). even more unsettling is the later 
revelation that “James Wolfe had red hair” (195). 
if the narrator’s identity is tenuous from early on, making him always 
“on the lookout for the foreign sound [of his own name] in the future” 
(19), his identity is wrenched from its moorings at the age of three 
when his parents and brother drown. it is this event that crystallizes his 
fixation on the paradoxical question of the contingency of the past, both 
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as predetermined and as accidental: “This is the story of how my sister 
and i, as three-year-old children, planned ‘to spend the night’ with our 
grandparents and remained instead for sixteen years until we left to go 
to university. This is a story of lives which turned out differently than 
was intended” (57). if a different life is what was intended, then this 
twist of fate becomes an origin that is not one. Yet it is quickly convert-
ed into destiny by the people who assess it immediately following the 
drowning: “[They] cast about for reasons. Perhaps since my parents had 
taken the job on the island they had not gone to church as often as they 
should have? Perhaps they had engaged in pre-marital sex . . .? Others 
told stories of forerunners . . . and of how such harbingers could now be 
seen as prophecies fulfilled” (54). Unofficially, the accident is deemed an 
“act of God” (54), thereby highlighting both possibilities: determinism 
and accident. Yet the narrator and his brother Calum remain tormented 
by the uncertain status of the event, and the narrative keeps circling 
back to it as a moment of “originary loss.” “if you had been with them,” 
the narrator says to his brother, “you would have gone down too,” to 
which his brother replies, “if i had been with them i might have saved 
them” (209). Both are haunted by the accidental nature of the event 
while also secretly suspecting that it was, indeed, what was meant to 
be. Grandpa’s near death on the ice some years earlier functions as a 
premonition of this event as well as an after-the-fact means of meditat-
ing on the paradox of fate: “Grandpa could have been lost as well and 
then things would have been quite a bit different — especially for you, 
’ ille bhig ruaidh” (182). The narrator and his brother are plagued by the 
prospect of what might not have been, tormented by the irresolvability 
of contingency and destiny. if their grandparents had moved to San 
Francisco, Calum ponders, “things would be much different for us” 
(208). if the parents had died sooner, Alexander and his sister “might 
never have been born” (216). “if your parents knew they were going to 
drown,” Grandpa admonishes the brothers, “do you think they would 
have started across?” (251). 
Alexander is also plagued by the apparent coincidence of his cousin 
Alexander’s death in the mine shaft on the very day that Alexander is 
awarded his university diploma: “there was a vague uneasiness associ-
ated with the circumstance and the timing of it all. . . . i realized that 
Alexander Macdonald had partially paid for the car which ferried me 
home from my splendid graduation” (172-73). To atone for the guilt 
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of coincidence and fate, the narrator goes to work in the mines with 
his brothers, offering himself as a substitute for his cousin, another 
gille beag ruadh, the red-haired Alexander Macdonald. it is also the 
shiftiness of fate that infuses his relationship with his brother Calum 
in the present, since the “accident” that results in Calum’s prison sen-
tence is set into motion by the narrator’s commitment to be true to his 
blood and help his American double: another red-haired Alexander 
Macdonald. Alexander, in retrospect, must struggle with his own com-
plicity in Calum’s fate. Grandma, also in retrospect, recalls having a 
premonition of Calum’s future when she sees him become fascinated 
by his reflection in a bottle of beer (190), yet the narrator also knows 
that it is the contingency of fate that is responsible: the accident that led 
to him and his sister being raised in relative security and affluence by 
their grandparents, while the three older brothers were left to their own 
devices, orphaned in the old clann Chalum Ruaidh homestead. 
Alexander Macdonald, as an adult, is, like his ancestor Calum 
Ruadh, mourning “for his history” (25), but is that history a past that 
has been left behind or a future that was to have become what it has 
not? This uncertainty complicates the notion of nostalgia as it has been 
applied to MacLeod’s works, for what we see here is not a longing to 
return to a home of the past but a longing to arrive at a past and future 
that was never allowed to be. On the one hand, he is mourning the loss 
of his parents and brother to the sea many years before, the definitive 
moment when destiny seemed to veer off course. indeed, in the present 
tense of the novel’s framing narrative, Alexander is mourning a complex 
of things: his parents’ and grandparents’ deaths, his brother Calum’s 
personal tragedy and physical decline, and the loss of a past time and 
place. But he is also mourning an impossible history, a past that never-
theless persists in haunting him through its tantalizing absence as a 
concrete individual memory. its force, in other words, arises precisely 
“in the collapse of its understanding” (Caruth 7). This is not to say 
that Alexander has no memories of the past but that the “memories” 
that plague him most are of things that never came to pass and that 
can therefore never be fully articulated. in effect, Alexander was denied 
the ability to symbolize the nature of his loss since he cannot clearly 
state what it is that has been lost. He cannot even fix on the loss of his 
parents, since he does not clearly remember them, being only three years 
old at the time of the accident. in this sense, he is plagued by memories 
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whose very status as “memories” is unclear. As Marlene Goldman writes 
with reference to Japanese Canadian historical narratives, “How can one 
begin to mourn, if one cannot name what has been lost?” (368). This 
is precisely Alexander’s dilemma. The curse of the “what if ” refuses to 
let him be. 
Stephen Greenblatt has written of the primary human trauma as 
“the fading of remembrance” (218), yet perhaps it is more accurate to 
speak of the incommensurability of remembrance as a memory. in the 
novel, the narrator and his brother are plagued by both the fading of 
remembrance and its steadfast refusal to fade. Like Grandma’s image 
of the nail in the shoe (one can get used to anything but a nail in one’s 
shoe), the traces of the past refuse to let them go. This is emblematized 
in Grandma’s Alzheimer’s-like condition toward the end of the book, 
a condition marked not by a loss of memory but by “the past in the 
present tense” (266). Grandma, like the narrator, is being stalked by 
remembrance. Tormenting him with its unavailability, the past taunts 
the narrator with simultaneous views of what was and what might not 
have been. As he says at the outset, “Sometimes it is hard to choose 
or not to choose those things which bother us at the most inappro-
priate of times” (2). He cannot not remember. The irony, however, is 
that Grandma no longer recognizes the narrator as the gille beag ruadh 
(272), which is apt given that he feels himself a long way from the clann 
Chalum Ruaidh at this point in his life, so in a sense she is accurately 
recognizing him for what he is not. However, it also highlights the 
epithet as one in a multitude of genealogical substitutions. “‘Oh, the 
gille beag ruadh,’ she says: ‘The gille beag ruadh is thousands of miles 
from here. Yet i would know him if i met him anywhere in this whole 
wide world’” (272). Of course, this is precisely what members of the 
clann Chalum Ruaidh do repeatedly — they keep stumbling upon, and 
embracing, members of the Macdonald clan in the most unlikely of 
places and projecting themselves into these individuals. invoking a kind 
of Lacanian misrecognition by presuming sameness in difference, the 
clann Chalum Ruaidh genealogy points to the inheritance of an integral 
ambivalence about origins, an inherited experience of unsettlement that 
is matched by an insistence on pursuing its effect. Like their dogs, the 
people are condemned to try too hard and care too much. 
The role of the gille beag ruadh is therefore twofold. As a kind of ori-
ginary marker, it always embeds within it a subsidiary trauma, a deferral 
No Great Mischief 145
that highlights the inherent undecidability of genealogical destiny itself. 
it evokes the insatiability of desire. To use Merleau-Ponty’s words, it 
captures the sense that “Whether it is mythical or utopian, there is a 
place where everything that is or will be is preparing, at the same time, 
to be spoken” (qtd. in Said, Beginnings 73). This “place” where the 
what was to become lies in gestation is also that which constitutes the 
inarticulable loss that persists in shadowing the narrator. 
it is significant, as well, that along with red hair, twins are a gen-
etic trace passed down through the family. The narrator, Alexander, 
is himself twinned with his black-haired sister Catherine (29). if the 
book is concerned with “our distinctness as individuals in a society of 
duplicates” (Schwartz 19), it is also concerned with our solitariness as 
individuals in the world of the present and hence courts the consolation 
that genealogy can afford. According to Hillel Schwartz, the persistence 
of twins in cultural narratives is due to the fact that a twin “makes of 
our selves our own kin” (21). in the novel, it is fraternal not identical 
twins that are inherited (29), enabling a straddling of the tenuous div-
ide between sameness and difference: almost the same but not quite. 
The twins, Alexander and Catherine (duplicates of their grandparents’ 
names), are linked by a shared history since they were the ones separated 
from their older siblings following the drowning. 
in later years, it is with Catherine that the narrator shares his most 
intimate discussions about origins and ancestry, for she, too, appears to 
be on a similar quest. Catherine, as well, is obsessed with the “what if?” 
of their inevitable yet haphazard destiny, while she is also concerned 
with the possibility of a genetic inheritance of the past. She aligns herself 
with their maternal grandfather, who “felt that if he couldn’t understand 
his immediate past, he would try to understand his distant past” (234). 
“Sometimes i think of clann Chalum Ruaidh,” she tells Alexander. “All 
of those people with their black and red hair. Like you and me. All of 
them intertwined. . . . i suppose this is the way adopted children feel 
when they wish to seek out their biological parents. They are perhaps 
looking for foreshadowings of themselves. Forerunners” (234-35). Yet, 
like the repeating red-haired boy, Catherine offers Alexander little con-
solation. Schwartz writes that twins “appear to tell us most of what we 
want to know about being uniquely human and . . . more than we want 
to know about feeling alone” (21). Because Alexander does not associate 
Catherine with the negative effects of a haphazard contingency, he is less 
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concerned with her fate. Touched by her own melancholy, she is in some 
ways too much a duplicate of him. it is the source of the melancholy 
that he is seeking, and it is the prematurely aging Calum, he suspects, 
who may hold the answers. 
if repetition is a means of avoiding the irreducible “abyss between the 
self and the permanently lost Thing” (Woodland 128), genealogical rep-
etition might offer some way of straddling this gulf. Malcolm Woodland 
expresses this through his assessment of the divergent teleologies that 
are invoked in different accounts of mourning and repetition: a teleol-
ogy of overcoming, and a teleology of “bewitchment” or a courting of 
loss (130), which approximates the condition of melancholia. if the gille 
beag ruadh points to “an always-receding horizon, a textual crux that 
both elicits and repels interpretation” (131), it is also the case that the 
novel is ambivalent with respect to this lack of closure. does the use of 
repetition (not only of genealogical characteristics such as red hair, black 
hair, twins, and six siblings but also of narrative elements such as songs, 
stories, names, images, phrases, and animals) suggest an “undesirable 
fixation on a past trauma” (132) or a fictive recuperation of absent ori-
gins? is the “striving for ‘retrieval’” an end in itself (132)? And does the 
work, finally, offer a view of where these two teleologies meet (137), 
thereby mediating, through the courting of genealogy, an approach to 
the unspeakable fact of human contingency? is “this inherited life” a 
blessing or a curse? 
Said speaks of our persistent obsession with origins as “a genetic 
optimism, that continuity is possible as intended by the . . . beginning” 
(48). Yet in MacLeod’s works, the trajectory from fixed inheritance to 
a sense of individual identity is ambiguous. is the little red-haired boy 
seeking a way of turning chance into destiny, or is it the horror of an 
apparently relentless destiny that pulls him up short? Which is more 
terrifying, in other words, to think that existence is all accident, or to 
think that it is predetermined? And does genealogy highlight chance 
or destiny, or both at once: the what might not have been? Slavoj Žižek 
writes of the retroactive fictionalization that occurs in narratives whose 
temporal linear progression is disrupted in some way. The ability to look 
at the past from the perspective of the present means that one knows 
the ending in advance, which invites one to deny the accidental nature 
of events and impose a teleology. it lures one into seeing things as pre-
destined (seeing coincidence or destiny where there may not be any), 
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encouraging a defiance of contingency. it enables a turning of chance 
into destiny, which is both reassuring and unsettling at the same time, 
since it provokes an awareness of the inescapable within the contin-
gent, “the idea of something fateful and inescapable when otherwise 
we should have spoken only of ‘chance’” (Freud, “Uncanny” 359-60). 
On the other hand, the retrospective eruption of a conclusive catastro-
phe renders palpable the contingency of events, the knowledge that an 
already known fate becomes sealed by an arbitrary event, which leads 
one to ask, “Will the unavoidable really happen?” (Žižek 70). Genealogy 
activates both sequences: on the one hand, the ending retroactively con-
fers a sense of teleology and inevitability; on the other, it highlights pure 
accident. The uncanny effect is to render one’s genealogical past both 
familiar and foreign. 
in the Canadian “settler” context, this paradox of origins is high-
lighted in what appears to be an increasingly urgent drive for genealogy 
in contemporary Canadian personal and cultural narratives.9
 
Stephen 
Turner defines what he calls the “settler unconscious” as an “accumu-
lated experience of unsettlement” (22), an “inherited” legacy of inarticu-
late melancholy that informs the constitution of national identity and 
that therefore applies to multiple groups within the national constitu-
ency, not just to the descendants of settlers. This dilemma is perhaps 
especially characteristic of settler-invader cultures that place their “ori-
ginary” roots in a moment of cultural and symbolic orphaning. if the 
need to establish origins here has been crucial for many non-Aboriginal 
Canadians (as Margaret Laurence’s Morag Gunn so clearly learned on 
her journey to the Scottish Highlands), this quest is always comprom-
ised. This is so because the very notion of settlement is premised on a 
denial of Aboriginal priority. As Tony Tremblay puts it, it is the settler 
narrative “that insists on beginning, . . . [and] that problematizes the 
start, and, once problematized, resolves inevitably to begin in nothing-
ness, privileging the absence it can name to the presence it cannot” 
(161). But if one’s ancestry — even one’s orphaning — appears to have 
been preordained or necessary (what was to become), where is MacLeod’s 
novel positioned in this settler trajectory? in other words, the desire for 
fixable origins may also be compromised because the retrospective gaze 
always grapples with the problem of destiny. is history foreordained or 
contingent, and how does this affect one’s reading of colonial history? 
Was it destiny or accident? 
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Laura Moss describes MacLeod’s novel in terms of “an assertion of 
the continuity of ‘settler’ history” (6). it is this, surely. But what is this 
urge for settler history providing? An experience of unsettlement, in the 
sense of the settlers’ inadequate occupation of a land that is haunted by 
a kind of return of the repressed past? Or is it that the settler history 
provides a sense of legitimating, albeit precarious, origins? if settler hist-
ory is always premised on a simultaneous remembering and forgetting 
of history/genealogy, it is also necessarily marked by a kind of anxiety 
of absent influence and origins. Postcolonial theorists have embraced 
the inherent paradox of the unhomely to highlight the uncanny nature 
of colonial experience. Homi Bhabha describes the colonial presence 
as “split between its appearance as original and authoritative and its 
articulation as repetition and difference” (107). Likewise, Alan Lawson 
speaks of the ways settler-invader narratives operate as “counterfeitings 
of both emergence and origination” (158). MacLeod’s novel takes this 
problematic as its focus, playing on a series of interrelated paradoxes in 
the quest for a genealogy of settler, national, and personal contingency. 
“Ah, ’ ille bhig ruaidh, you’ve come at last” (8). 
Notes 
1 ironically, “The Chance” is provided by the “come by chance” since the grand-
father arranges the new job for Grandpa. 
2 in a sense, one might see this as a prototheme of MacLeod’s much earlier story 
“The Boat,” to the extent that the “accident” of the father’s death, and the son’s inherit-
ance of his father’s temperament, threaten, in the future, to become inherited patterns 
in turn linked to a fear of “be[ing] alone with death” (Island 1). in “As Birds Bring 
Forth the Sun,” the narrator identifies the family’s inheritance as “our own peculiar 
mortality” (320). in both stories, contingency (in the sense of both accident and cause 
and effect) and fate are inextricably entwined, just as inheritance/origins are necessarily 
caught up with a concept of descent/mortality. To see one’s origins in a genetic family 
line is also to see oneself as necessarily mortal and, horrifically, replaceable. 
3 This is echoed in Alexander’s inheritance of the original Calum Ruadh’s “crying 
for his history” in No Great Mischief (25). Both are plagued by a history that veered 
off course. 
4 According to Said in his introduction to The World, the Text, and the Critic, the 
modern period has been marked by “the transition from a failed idea or possibility of 
filiation to a kind of compensatory order that, whether it is a party, an institution, a 
culture, a set of beliefs, or even a world-vision, provides men and women with a new 
form of relationship, which i have been calling affiliation” (19). “The loss of the sub-
ject,” he continues, “is in various ways the loss as well of the procreative, generational 
urge authorizing filiative relationships” (20). 
No Great Mischief 149
5 This is certainly the case in “Vision,” where there is no single originary ancestor, 
and, indeed, the two warring families appear to be related in devolving their ancestry 
from the Hebridean island of Canna and in both having ancestral tales of Da Shealladh 
(“second sight”). 
6 A similar rift in genealogical memory occurs in “As Birds Bring Forth the Sun.” 
When the great-great-great-grandfather is killed by the cù mòr glas, “He was no longer 
there for his own child of the spring who, in turn, became my great-great-grandfather, 
and he was perhaps too much there in the memory of his older sons who saw him fall” 
(Island 317). 
7 See, for example, articles by davidson; Hiscock; Nicholson; and Riegel. 
Creelman’s assessment of MacLeod’s oeuvre is distinct in that Creelman convincingly 
identifies a shift from MacLeod’s early writings, which he suggests indicate a rejec-
tion of nostalgia in their “refusal to idealize the past” (“Hoping” 84), and the later 
works, in As Birds Bring Forth the Sun, which demonstrate an increasingly nostalgic 
vision. See also Creelman’s chapter on MacLeod in Setting in the East: Maritime Realist 
Fiction. One might say that in No Great Mischief loss is already embedded in the past, 
with Alexander’s personal history of disruption being analogous to the ruptures and 
dislocations initiated by the processes of modernization. 
8 in this i would disagree with Creelman’s contention that, “For the characters in 
No Great Mischief, a sense of personal identity can be attained only as the individuals 
connect themselves to the historically anchored, collectively constituted community” 
(96-97). For Alexander, it is the anxiety that arises from this desire, precisely because 
it is impossible, that persists in haunting him. 
9 See my article “(dis)inheriting the Nation: Contemporary Canadian Memoirs and 
the Anxiety of Origins.” 
Works Cited 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. Rev. ed. London: Verso, 1991. 
Atwood, Margaret. In Search of Alias Grace: On Writing Canadian Historical Fiction. 
Ottawa: U of Ottawa P, 1997. 
Bhabha, Homi K. “Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority 
under a Tree outside delhi, May 1817.” The Location of Culture. By Bhabha. London: 
Routledge, 1994. 102-22. 
Bollas, Christopher. The Shadow of the Object: Psychoanalysis of the Unthought Known. New 
York: Columbia UP, 1987. 
Caruth, Cathy. introduction. Trauma: Explorations in Memory. ed. Caruth. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins UP, 1995. 3-12. 
Creelman, david. “‘Hoping to Strike Some Sort of Solidity’: The Shifting Fictions of 
Alistair MacLeod.” Studies in Canadian Literature 24.2 (1999): 79-99. 
—. Setting in the East: Maritime Realist Fiction. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s UP, 2003. 
davidson, Arnold e. “As Birds Bring Forth the Story: The elusive Art of Alistair MacLeod.” 
Canadian Literature 119 (1988): 32-42. 
derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins UP, 1976. 
—. The Work of Mourning. ed. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas. Chicago: U of 
Chicago P, 2001. 
150 Scl/Élc
Fink, Bruce. “The Real Cause of Repetition.” Reading Seminar XI: Lacan’s Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. ed. Richard Feldstein, Bruce Fink, and 
Maire Jaanus. New York: State U of New York P, 1995. 223-29. 
Freud, Sigmund. “The ‘Uncanny.’” Art and Literature. ed. Albert dickson. Trans. James 
Strachey. Vol. 14 of The Pelican Freud Library. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985. 339-
76. 
Goldman, Marlene. “A dangerous Circuit: Loss and the Boundaries of Racialized 
Subjectivity in Joy Kogawa’s Obasan and Kerri Sakamoto’s The Electrical Field.” 
Modern Fiction Studies 48.2 (2002): 362-88. 
Greenblatt, Stephen. Hamlet in Purgatory. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2001. 
Guilford, irene, ed. Alistair MacLeod: Essays on His Works. Toronto: Guernica, 2001. 
Hiscock, Andrew. “‘This inherited Life’: Alistair MacLeod and the ends of History.” 
Journal of Commonwealth Literature 35.2 (2000): 51-70. 
Lawson, Alan. “Postcolonial Theory and the ‘Settler’ Subject.” Unhomely States: Theorizing 
English-Canadian Postcolonialism. ed. Cynthia Sugars. Peterborough: Broadview, 
2004. 151-64. 
MacLeod, Alistair. “An interview with Alistair MacLeod.” With Shelagh Rogers. Guilford 
11-35. 
—. Island: The Collected Stories. Toronto: McClelland, 2000. 
—. No Great Mischief. Toronto: McClelland, 1999. 
—. “A Writer’s Life: Geography as inspiration.” Munro Beattie Lecture. Carleton U, 
Ottawa. 30 Jan. 2004. 
Moodie, Susanna. Roughing It in the Bush; Or, Life in Canada. ed. elizabeth Thompson. 
Ottawa: Tecumseh, 1997. 
Moss, Laura. “is Canada Postcolonial? introducing the Question.” Is Canada Postcolonial? 
Unsettling Canadian Literature. ed. Moss. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier UP, 2003. 1-
23. 
Nicholson, Colin. “Signatures of Time: Alistair MacLeod and His Short Stories.” Canadian 
Literature 107 (1985): 90-101. 
Riegel, Christian. “elegy and Mourning in Alistair MacLeod’s ‘The Boat.’” Studies in Short 
Fiction 35.3 (1998): 233-40. 
—. Writing Grief: Margaret Laurence and the Work of Mourning. Winnipeg: U of Manitoba 
P, 2003. 
Said, edward. Beginnings. New York: Columbia UP, 1975. 
—. The World, the Text, and the Critic. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1983. 
Schwartz, Hillel. The Culture of the Copy: Striking Likenesses, Unreasonable Facsimiles. New 
York: Zone, 1996. 
Sugars, Cynthia. “(dis)inheriting the Nation: Contemporary Canadian Memoirs and the 
Anxiety of Origins.” Moveable Margins: The Shifting Spaces of Canadian Literature. 
Toronto: TSAR, 2005. 177-202. 
Tremblay, Tony. “Piracy, Penance, and Other Penal Codes: A Morphology of Postcolonial 
Revision in Three Recent Texts by Rudy Wiebe, John Steffler, and Joan Clark.” English 
Studies in Canada 23.2 (1997): 159-73. 
Turner, Stephen. “Settlement as Forgetting.” Quicksands: Foundational Histories in Australia 
and Aotearoa New Zealand. ed. Klaus Veumann et al. Sydney: U of New South Wales 
P, 1999. 20-38. 
Urquhart, Jane. “The Vision of Alistair MacLeod.” Guilford 36-42. 
Woodland, Malcolm. “‘Pursuit of Unsayables’: Repetition in Kristeva’s Black Sun and 
Strand’s ‘Two de Chiricos.’” Mosaic 37.3 (2004): 121-38. 
Žižek, Slavoj. Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture. 
Cambridge: MiT P, 1991. 
